MSP due diligence
Questions to Ask an MSP Before You Sign or Renew
A service-level promise is useful only when someone can show who acts, how quickly, and with which authority.
Open the checklistRead from the buyer’s chair, vendor evaluation is how you tell a real solution from a decorated demo and hold a vendor to what it promised. Now that every vendor claims an AI story, the questionnaire has to reach the model, the agent and the supply chain behind the product.
Reviewed October 5, 2026 · Standards in force

A traditional questionnaire asks about encryption, access control and SOC 2. It does not ask which model the product runs, where that model came from, whether an agent can call tools it was never approved to use, or whether anyone has tried to break it with adversarial prompts. Those are now the questions that predict an incident. This week’s attacks also showed that known, unpatched flaws stay in play for months, so a vendor’s patch speed and advisory honesty belong in the score.
B3 scoring guide. Weight the AI rows higher when the product holds credentials or acts on your systems.
| Domain | What to ask | Evidence to request | Red flag |
|---|---|---|---|
| Model provenance | Which models, versions and providers power the product? | AI bill of materials, model cards, change log | “Proprietary” with no named base model or version history |
| Secret scanning | How are keys and tokens kept out of code, logs and prompts? | Scanner output, rotation runbook, last rotation date | Long-lived shared API keys |
| Tool-call control | Can agents call tools outside an approved list? | Allowlist configuration, blocked-call logs, alerting demo | Agents inherit the full permissions of the user |
| Adversarial red-teaming | Who tested the product, how recently, against what? | Red-team summary mapped to OWASP agentic risks, fix dates | Only the model provider’s generic safety testing |
| Traditional controls | Do SOC 2, ISO 27001, MFA, encryption and logging cover AI features? | SOC 2 Type II scope, ISO certificates, pen-test letter | AI features excluded from the audit scope |
| Patch and disclosure | How fast do advisories, workarounds and fixes ship? | Last three advisories with timestamps | Exploited flaws disclosed only after customers find them |
| Third-party AI agents | What can the vendor's agent reach in our environment, and who controls its control plane? | Agent permission map, control-plane version, identity-provider configuration | Agents share one service account or run without an identity provider |
| Supply-chain dependency scanning | How are open-source and model dependencies scanned before release? | SBOM and AI-BOM per release, dependency-scan results, pinned versions | No SBOM, or dependencies pulled at runtime |
| Cryptographic origin verification | Are releases and model artifacts signed, with verifiable provenance? | Sigstore signatures, SLSA provenance attestations, key-management policy | Unsigned updates or checksums published on the same server |
| API permission scoring | Which OAuth scopes and API keys does the product request, and why? | Scope list mapped to features, automated over-permission report | Standing tenant-wide admin consent |
| LLM conversation data handling | How are prompts, outputs and chat logs retained, reviewed and deleted? | Retention schedule, human-review policy, deletion certificate | Indefinite retention or reviewer access by default |
| Sandbox isolation | How is AI-generated or untrusted code isolated, and how is the hypervisor patched? | Isolation design, hypervisor patch SLA, egress and credential limits per sandbox | Shared containers for untrusted code or no stated patch window |
| AI incident disclosure | Can you produce logs of your agents' actions on our data, and when will you notify us? | Sample action log, notification clause, retention period | No per-customer agent logs or no AI incident clause |
| Edge patch history | When did you fix your last three exploited flaws, and did any fix need a second upgrade? | Advisory dates, time to fixed build, re-patch history | Repeated re-patches or no published advisories |
| Agent prompt-injection resistance | Can content from email or documents make your agent run code or send data? | Test results, pre-execution blocking design, connected-account scoping | Warnings only after execution or no testing |
This is one of the six domains in the readiness assessment. See where your organization actually stands.
Take the readiness assessmentCitrix customers who patched NetScaler for September's zero-days must upgrade again for CVE-2026-88779 if they use SAML. Salt Labs showed one email could hijack the Manus agent before its warning appeared. Both are evaluation questions you can ask now.
Test now: Add two lines to every edge and AI vendor review: your last three exploited-flaw fix dates, and your prompt-injection test results.
Read the October 5 brief →Curated public-sector and regulated-technology speeches, each with buyer-side commentary.
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